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THE QUEST FOR RELIGIOUS PURITY IN NEW AGE, 
EVANGELICALISM AND ISLAM
RELIGIOUS RENDITIONS OF DUTCH YOUTH AND THE 
LUCKMANN LEGACY
Johan Roeland, Stef Aupers, Dick Houtman, Martijn de Koning 
and Ineke Noomen
Introduction
Even though it is beyond doubt that the once virtually omnipresent 
churched Christian religiosity has lost much of its former appeal in 
particularly the Northwestern-European countries (e.g., Norris and 
Inglehart, 2004), there are other and arguably more interesting stories 
to tell about the fate of religion in the West than that of its inevitable 
decline. These other stories address the changing shapes of religion 
among the remaining faithful, and the younger generations among 
them in particular (e.g., Achterberg et al., 2009). 
To gain insight into religion’s changing character in the contem-
porary West, this article discusses contemporary religious discourses 
and practices among youngsters in the Netherlands, where the Chris-
tian churches have lost even more of their former appeal and legiti-
macy than almost anywhere else in the Western world. Substantially, 
we address New Age spirituality, Evangelicalism and Islam, the three 
most popular, vital and visible strains of religion among contempo-
rary Dutch youth. The three are nowadays not only embraced much 
more enthusiastically by the younger generations than any other type 
of religion, but moreover attain some striking features in their hands 
that serve to set them apart from the traditional types of church-based 
or mosque-based religion embraced by older generations of faithful.
Research has indicated that in the Netherlands and most other 
Western countries post-Christian spiritualities of life (‘New Age’) are 
more popular among the younger generations than among the elderly 
(Houtman and Aupers, 2007; Houtman and Mascini, 2002), while 
in Christian circles Evangelicalism is the single type of religion that 
today manages to arouse great enthusiasm among the young (Roeland, 
2009). Although, needless to say, Evangelicalism is quite distinct from 
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New Age spirituality and sets itself decidedly apart from it, we will see 
that there are nevertheless striking resemblances between the two that 
account for their popularity among the young. Likewise, the Islamic 
discourses and practices found among particularly Moroccan-Dutch 
youngsters, in particular those involved in Salafi networks, differ strik-
ingly from these of their parents and equally strikingly resemble what 
we find among New Agers and Evangelicals.
From a theoretical point of view, the common features New Age, 
Evangelicalism, and Islam attain in the hands of contemporary Dutch 
youngsters highlight some major weaknesses in Thomas Luckmann’s 
(1967) classical account of modern religion as radically privatized. 
This is not without significance, because his The Invisible Religion is 
arguably the most important book in sociology of religion since World 
War II and has shaped sociology of religion more than any other book 
during the last four decades. 
Luckmann’s main argument is that, although structural differentia-
tion in modern society inevitably results in an erosion of the Christian 
monopoly, this does not simply mean the end of religion. Instead, he 
maintains, a ‘market of ultimate significance’ emerges, where religious 
consumers shop for strictly personal packages of meaning that remain 
without wider social and public significance. Ever since the appear-
ance of Luckmann’s book, accounts of modern religion as radically 
privatized, fragmented and socially and publicly insignificant have 
almost attained the status of sociological truisms. Modern religion has 
hence endlessly been understood as ‘almost an exclusively psychologi-
cal phenomenon, with very limited and indirect social consequence’, 
as Besecke (2005: 187) rightly points out, adding that ‘Luckmann’s 
characterization of contemporary religion as privatized is pivotal in 
the sociology of religion; it has been picked up by just about everyone 
and challenged by almost no one’ (Ibid.: 186). We demonstrate in this 
paper, however, that this is not at all what we find among young Dutch 
New Agers, Evangelicals and Muslims: their religion is neither ephem-
eral and superficial (section 2), nor socially unorganized (section 3), 
nor publicly insignificant (section 4).
Luckmann’s book is hence just as much to be praised for its much-
needed widening of sociology of religion’s scope beyond the study 
of firmly institutionalized Christian religion (Aupers and Houtman, 
2009) as it is to be blamed for the relentless portrayal of modern reli-
gion as ‘socially insignificant’, ‘uncommitted’, and ‘strictly personal’. 
Indeed, we will argue in this paper that the Luckmann legacy may have 
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blinded sociologists of religion to processes of religious revitalization 
and rejuvenation that are taking place right before their eyes in West-
ern countries like the Netherlands. Although, needless to say, much 
more research is needed to draw up a fair balance of the empirical 
correctness of the Luckmann legacy, we underscore that what follows 
is based on years of empirical research in each of the three religious 
subcultures in the Netherlands (e.g., Aupers, 2004; Aupers and Hout-
man, 2006; Bartels and De Koning, 2006; De Koning, 2008a; Houtman 
and Aupers, 2007; Houtman and Mascini, 2002; Noomen et al., 2006; 
Roeland, 2008, 2009).
Religious Privatization or Religious Purification?
New Age Spirituality: ‘Eternal Spiritual Wisdom’
Ever since the appearance of Luckmann’s book New Age spirituality 
has been understood as, the best example of a modern type of reli-
gion that constitutes nothing more than an incoherent collection of 
strictly personal spiritual ideas and practices. Participants in the spiri-
tual milieu, it has been repeated again and again, tend to draw upon 
multiple traditions, styles and ideas simultaneously, combining these 
into idiosyncratic packages. New Age has thus been understood as a 
‘consumer religion par excellence’ (Possamai, 2005: 49), ‘pick-and-mix 
religion’ (Hamilton, 2000), ‘do-it-yourself religion’ (Baerveldt, 1996) 
or a ‘spiritual supermarket’ (Lyon, 2000). Every single person in the 
spiritual milieu, Possamai maintains, constructs a ‘subjective myth’ and 
it is as if ‘every human being should have his own paradigm’ (2005: 
57) , while Steve Bruce (2002: 99) characterized New Age as a ‘diffuse 
religion’, noting that ‘there is no (. . .) power in the cultic milieu to 
override individual preferences’. 
These relentless portrayals of New Age spirituality as religiously 
incoherent blatantly miss the shared and undisputed discourse of 
‘self-spirituality’ in the holistic milieu, a discourse that paradoxically 
demands and hence produces these omnipresent practices of individ-
ual bricolage. Ironically, then, these practices stem from a shared and 
morally binding religious discourse that insists that one should ‘follow 
one’s personal path’ and ‘listen to one’s inner voice’, rather than ‘prov-
ing’ its non-existence (Aupers and Houtman, 2006). This uncontested 
discourse of ‘self-spirituality’ postulates that the sacred cannot be 
found ‘out there’, like the transcendent personal God of Christianity 
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or Islam, but rather ‘in here’ (Heelas and Houtman, 2009). In Heelas’ 
(1996: 19) words: ‘[. . .] the most pervasive and significant aspect of the 
lingua franca of the New Age is that the person is, in essence, spiritual. 
To experience the ‘Self’ itself is to experience ‘God’, ‘the Goddess’, 
the ‘Source’, ‘Christ Consciousness’, the ‘inner child’, the ‘way of the 
heart’, or, most simply and [. . .] most frequently, ‘inner spirituality’’ 
(emphasis in original). Put crudely, then, New Agers believe that peo-
ple do not have one, but two selves: they contrast a ‘mundane’, ‘con-
ventional’, ‘unnatural’ or ‘socialized’ self, demonized as the ‘false’ or 
‘unreal’ product of society and its institutions, with a ‘higher’, ‘deeper’, 
‘true’, ‘natural’, ‘authentic’ or ‘spiritual’ self.
This spiritual self is conceived as laying hidden behind, beyond, or 
underneath the mundane self, residing in the deeper emotional lay-
ers of consciousness and understood as representing the person one 
‘really’ or ‘at deepest’ is. It is believed to be intimately tied up with a 
universal power, life force or energy (mostly referred to as ‘ki’ or ‘chi’) 
that holistically permeates and connects ‘all’, that is, nature, society, 
and the cosmos. One’s feelings, intuitions, and experiences are under-
stood as emanations of this spiritual self, so that acting according to 
them is understood as connecting to this whole. According to New 
Agers, one should hence ‘follow one’s heart’: do what ‘feels good’ and 
refrain from what ‘feels bad’. ‘The basic idea’, again in Paul Heelas’ 
words (1996: 23), ‘is that what lies within—experienced by way of 
‘intuition’, ‘alignment’ or an ‘inner voice’—serves to inform the judg-
ments, decisions and choices required for everyday life’. In New Age 
spirituality, in short, taking one’s personal feelings and intuitions seri-
ously is conceived as bringing life into line with who one ‘essentially’ 
or ‘at deepest’ is, and consequently as connecting to ‘all that exists’ (see 
also Hanegraaff, 1996).
This New Age discourse understands established religious tradi-
tions as flawed and alienating renditions of this eternal spiritual truth, 
because these have buried the latter under layers of dogma and doc-
trine, imposed upon the laity by powerful and dogmatic priesthoods. 
Religious traditions are as such not rejected tout court, but rather seen 
as placing too much emphasis on ritual conformity and institutional 
side issues, while ‘deep down’ they all refer to this same eternal and 
universal spiritual wisdom. In effect, New Age understands established 
religious traditions and institutions as alienating and misleading to 
the extent that they define themselves as conflicting with and superior 
to one another. They are seen as ‘manmade’ and hence ‘artificial’ and 
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‘inauthentic’ corruptions that have subordinated the eternal spiritual 
wisdom to institutional interests (Hanegraaff 1996: 325). Practices 
of individual bricolage are hence rooted in the so-called philosophia 
perennis or ‘perennial philosophy’ that stems from Western esoteri-
cism and maintains that ‘there are many paths, but just one truth’. 
Evangelicalism: ‘Going One’s Own Way with God’
Something similar goes for Protestant Evangelicalism. The conviction 
that faith is primarily and eventually exclusively about the ‘heart of 
the believer’, i.e., about personal commitment rather than mere con-
formity to religious institutions, of course is and always has been a 
decisive feature of Protestantism. Although this emphasis on the heart 
of the believer has not prevented Protestantism from accepting all 
sorts of mediations between God and the individual, the conscious-
ness and faith of the ‘single individual’ (Weber 2002[1930]: 60) and 
his or her immediate and unmediated relationship to God have always 
constituted Protestantism’s single locus of practice and belief, in effect 
downplaying the relevance of supra-individual mediations and insti-
tutions (Keane, 2007). Evangelicalism, embraced enthusiastically by 
many young Dutch Protestants today, epitomizes and radicalizes this 
decisive feature of Protestantism (Roeland, 2009). 
Contemporary Dutch Evangelicalism emphasizes the individual 
believer’s personal relationship with God as the core of faith, not infre-
quently as a reaction to a firmly institutionalized Protestantism that is 
held to be too much preoccupied with the organization of the church 
or the righteousness of dogma. Much like New Agers, Evangelicals 
hence feature a Jamesian aversion to—or, at the very least, relativiza-
tion of—the ecclesiastical organization of faith. ‘It is all’, to quote a 
respondent from Roeland’s (2009) study of Evangelical youngsters in 
the Netherlands, ‘about your personal life. It is not about the church 
you attend. It is all about your personal relationship with God. Your 
personal relationship with Jesus. Your personal relationship with the 
Holy Spirit.’ This young man exemplifies the Evangelical conviction 
that church authorities and dogmas are subordinated to the individual 
believer’s faith and his or her personal relationship with God. Faith is, 
to quote another respondent, primarily about ‘going one’s own way 
with God’ and the compass to guide one on one’s path is found in 
one’s personal feelings and experiences rather than in the authority of 
the church and its religious doctrines.
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Contemporary Dutch Evangelicalism pushes the typically Protestant 
impetus towards the ‘purification’ of religion to its limits, spawning a 
radical religious individualism, i.e., an authentication of unmediated, 
experiential faith and a primacy of the epistemological principle of 
the authority of the self (Campbell, 2007: 344 ff; Van Harskamp, 2000; 
Versteeg, 2009). Given this emphasis on personal feelings and experi-
ences it is hardly surprising that spokesmen (spokeswomen can hardly 
be found in these circles) of more traditional and conservative strains 
of churched Protestantism point out Evangelicalism’s resemblance to 
the type of New Age spirituality discussed above. They observe that 
Evangelicalism, just like New Age, encourages practices of ‘bricolage’ 
and ‘pick ‘n’ choose religion’ and lament its detrimental consequences, 
particularly the erosion of church authority and dogma. The conser-
vative Protestant theologian Horton, for instance, was quoted in the 
Dutch orthodox Protestant newspaper Het Reformatorisch Dagblad 
(January 9, 2008) as saying that he considered Evangelicals ‘religious 
zappers’, who ‘compose their own religious cocktail, which is drenched 
by emotionalism’. Orthodox observers like Horton hence suggest that 
the Evangelical search for authentic and purified faith ends up in mere 
hyper-individual subjective preferences (Cotton, 1995), similar to the 
portrayal of New Age as radically fragmented and individualized in 
the sociological literature.
A Quest for Pure Islam
Contemporary renditions of Islam as found among Moroccan-Dutch 
youth feature a similar quest for religious purity beyond established 
Islamic traditions and institutions. Already from the 1990s onwards, 
researchers have witnessed an increasing salience of Muslim iden-
tity and Islam among Moroccan-Dutch youth (e.g., Bartelink, 1994; 
Buitelaar, 2002; Phalet, Lotringen, and Entzinger, 2000; Sunier, 1996), 
understood back then as an attempt to escape the impossible choice 
between ‘being Moroccan’ and ‘being Dutch’ (De Koning, 2008a; 
Entzinger and Dourleijn, 2006; Ketner, 2008). This strategy backfired 
however when after ‘9/11’ the focus of media and politics shifted to 
Islam and Muslims and their alleged lack of loyalty, and even threat, to 
Dutch society (Vliegenthart, 2007). Since then, Islam has increasingly 
been portrayed as prone to terrorism, intolerance, and oppression of 
women, and Moroccan-Dutch youth feel that they have come to be 
treated less willingly by the native Dutch. This situation only aggra-
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vated after Pim Fortuyn’s election campaign and subsequent assassina-
tion in 2002; public statements by critics of Islam like Ayaan Hirsi Ali, 
Theo van Gogh, and Geert Wilders; the release of Hirsi Ali’s anti-Islam 
movie Submission in 2004 and finally the murder of Van Gogh in that 
same year.
In short, Moroccan-Dutch youth have increasingly come to expe-
rience the Dutch Islam debate as a struggle against their religion, 
which forces them to once again make an impossible choice—this 
time between ‘being Muslim’ and ‘being Dutch’. This has made them 
increasingly self-conscious about their religious identity and has drawn 
them into debates about ‘what Islam really says’ about, for instance, 
violent attacks against non-believers, homosexuality, the position of 
women, living as a Muslim in a non-Islamic country, and so on. In 
this context, the Islam of their parents has lost its ‘self-evidence’ and 
‘naturalness’ and their own Islamic identities are increasingly actively 
constructed and negotiated. This applies to girls in particular, because 
much more than boys they find their behavior and attire scrutinized 
by other Dutch Moroccans and the native Dutch alike. They challenge 
the latter’s stereotypes of ‘oppressed Muslim women’ and criticize the 
gender inequalities they experience in their relations with the former. 
More than anything else, the increased salience of Islamic identi-
ties among Dutch Muslim youth has spawned a quest for ‘real’ or 
‘true’ Islam, understood as more ‘pure’ than the compromised and 
particularistic Islam preached in most Dutch mosques. The latter is 
understood as diluting the message of ‘true’ Islam in such a way that 
it ‘offends neither God nor the West’, thus compromising ‘true’ Islam 
by selling out in exchange for financial subsidies or mere approval of 
the Dutch authorities. Differences between various strains of Islam in 
the Netherlands, a consequence of immigration from various Islamic 
countries (particularly Morocco and Turkey) and regions with distinct 
cultural and religious traditions, undermine the plausibility and legiti-
macy of each of these even further. If young Muslims find out from 
their classmates that, for instance, ‘Moroccan Islam’ differs in crucial 
ways from ‘Turkish Islam’, it becomes quite clear to them that these 
cannot both claim to represent ‘true Islam’.
Precisely this awareness sparks a desire to separate truth from falsity 
that results in a process of religious ‘purification’ that is not unlike 
what we find among New Agers and Evangelicals. Because the estab-
lished traditions and institutions are different among themselves, they 
come to be understood as shaped by historically grown traditions 
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and/or (in the case of Islam) national cultures, and hence as ‘false’ 
and ‘inauthentic’. In the case of Islam, this spawns strongly felt needs 
among Moroccan-Dutch youth to disentangle national culture and 
Islam, resulting in an ongoing purification of their cultural repertoires. 
Needless to say, this quest for ‘pure’ Islam is accompanied by major 
debates and conflicts about who interprets Islam ‘correctly’ and hence 
represents ‘the truth’—particularly between youth on the one hand 
and their parents and, more generally, the older generation of Dutch 
Muslims, on the other (De Koning, 2008a). 
This search for ‘true’ and ‘pure’ Islam is particularly salient among 
those who adhere to Salafism, an Islamic purification movement that 
has been active throughout the ages. It stresses the doctrine of the 
unity and uniqueness of God, or tawhid, as its main tenet and claims 
that the golden period of Islam ended after the first three generations 
of Muslims (around 810 AD), referred to as the ‘pious forefathers’ 
(al-salaf al-salih) (Meijer, 2009). The Salafi movement wants to revital-
ize Islam on the basis of an idealized and homogenized understanding 
of Islam as it existed in its early years, aiming to cleanse its contempo-
rary manifestations from allegedly non-Islamic accretions like Sufism, 
Shi’a Islam, and local practices and doctrines held to have diluted and 
sullied its true message (Meijer, 2009). The Salafi movement is nowa-
days decidedly transnational, consists of local and global branches, 
and is characterized by a network structure. Although Salafi networks 
all share the doctrine of the unity and uniqueness of God, they differ 
widely in their strategies that may, depending on local circumstances, 
range from quietist to political and sometimes violent activities of 
da’wa—mission—and jihad (De Koning, 2009b). 
Not unlike what we have seen for New Age and Evangelicalism, 
many elderly first-generation Dutch Muslims accuse their Salafist off-
spring of creating massively individualized renditions of Islam through 
copy-pasting texts from Islamic scholars and the Quran, and sometimes 
also secular political ideologies. They regard the resulting pastiches as 
outcomes of a fatal combination of all-too-easy Internet access (and 
hence access to a world of sources), ignorance about Islamic tradi-
tions, and emotional outrage about local and global Muslim predica-
ments. National Muslim organizations (Nederlandse Moslim Raad, 
2007), intelligence and security services (AIVD, 2006) and research-
ers (Meijer, 2006) nonetheless understand these youthful practices of 
copy-pasting as creating a dangerously radicalized Islam.
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Although the quest for ‘pure’ Islam is not restricted to the Salafist 
movement, the latter has been the most successful in attracting Dutch 
Muslim youth, Moroccan-Dutch in particular. This is because the 
Salafist movement not only teaches its doctrines and practices, but also 
carves out a social space where Muslim youth can feel accepted and 
can express, nurture and enhance their faith (imaan), which is under-
stood as being endangered by secular Western society. Participants of 
the movement typically conceive of their identities in terms of a con-
version from ‘sleeping Muslims’ to ‘returning to Islam’, with Salafism 
offering the latter in its ‘real’, ‘authentic’, and ‘unpolluted’ form.
Religious Purity beyond Traditions and Institutions 
Young New Agers, Evangelicals and Muslims all feature a critical 
stance vis-à-vis established religious traditions and institutions. They 
understand these as ‘manmade’ and hence ‘artificial’ and ‘inauthentic’ 
renditions of a ‘pure’ and ‘eternal’ religious or spiritual truth. New 
Agers embrace the perennialist understanding that all religious tra-
ditions are essentially perverted and distorted versions of the eternal 
spiritual wisdom that can be found within the self; young Evangeli-
cals want to go beyond the church and its dogmas to establish a per-
sonal and unmediated relationship with God; young Salafist Muslims, 
finally, are critical of the culturalized religions of their parents and aim 
to return to ‘pure’ Islam. 
It is clear that these religious purification processes do not entail the 
strictly personal, ephemeral, uncommitted, and superficial religiosities 
emphasized in the Luckmann legacy. They do, after all, not so much 
entail moves away from established religious traditions and institu-
tions to less committing positions, but rather moves beyond these to 
more committing ones. They entail, in other words, a search for eternal 
and solidly grounded religious truths that lie beyond the flawed and 
particularistic institutions and traditions in the real world. This is not 
a postmodern flight to the surface (Jameson, 1991; Possamai, 2005), 
but a quest for ‘solid’, ‘deep’ and ‘real’ foundations in a world ruined 
by religious complacency and shiftlessness.
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Sociality beyond Church and Mosque
Introduction
The second major assumption of Luckmann’s The Invisible Religion is 
that contemporary religion lacks social organization. The implicit point 
of reference here is, of course, the Christian church with its strong 
social grip on its members. After the loss of the Christian monopoly 
in the West, Luckmann maintains, institutionalized Christianity made 
way for an open spiritual marketplace in which individuals could seek 
for spiritual meaning. Just like Luckmann’s assumption of contempo-
rary religion as ephemeral and fragmented, this dichotomy between 
‘thick’ and ‘greedy’ religious institutions that sustain social cohesion 
on the one hand and freely roaming and socially disembedded individ-
uals on the other is also taken for granted in much of the literature. 
Networked Sociality
Notwithstanding their aversion to particularistic religious traditions 
and ‘thick’ religious institutions, however, the spiritual and religious 
quests of young New Agers, Evangelicals and Muslims are certainly 
not socially detached ones. New Agers, for instance, relentlessly seek 
for spiritual inspiration at festivals that are the Dutch equivalents of 
better-known international ones like Body-Mind-Spirit (United King-
dom) or Burning Man (United States); they visit spiritual centers 
(Aupers, 2005), of which Glastonbury (Scotland) is the internation-
ally best-known example; they participate in discussion groups about 
New Age bestsellers like The Celestine Prophecy or The Secret; and they 
participate in group trainings and courses where they intimately sup-
port one another and experience ‘inner spirituality’ in a, quite literally, 
collective embrace. In a similar vein, young Evangelicals visit musical 
events and large festivals in the Netherlands, where they sing, dance, 
praise the lord and experience ‘togetherness’, ‘sociality’ and ‘collec-
tive effervescence’ in a truly Durkheimian fashion. And although the 
search for ‘pure’ Islam leads young Muslims away from the mosques 
and imams of their parents, it simultaneously reunites them into all 
sorts of discussion groups, loosely-knit networks and online commu-
nities on the Internet, as well as in lecture circles and Islamic courses 
in people’s homes (De Koning, 2008a, 2009b).
In contemporary Dutch religion we are hence not so much witness-
ing the withering away of the social, as the Luckmann legacy suggests, 
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but rather the radical transformation of its organizational forms (cf. 
Maffesoli, 1996). Young New Agers, Evangelicals and Muslims are 
connected through and embedded in networked forms of sociality. 
They are all three particularly strongly present as virtual communi-
ties on the Internet and New Agers (neo-pagans in particular) were 
even among the ‘first religious subcultures to colonize cyberspace’ 
(Davis, 1998: 184). In these online communities they exchange infor-
mation, shape and re-affirm their pagan identities and even perform 
collective online rituals (e.g., Noomen et al., 2006; Penzack, 2001; 
Radde-Antweiler, 2006). Some of them even consider the Internet 
their ‘church—in lack of a better word’ (Nightmare, 2001). Likewise, 
Evangelicals and Muslims (Becker, 2008; Benschop, 2005; De Koning, 
2008b) use web forums and chat groups to exchange ideas, to ‘bond’ 
and ‘bridge’ and to express and re-affirm their religious identities. 
The Internet provides young Dutch New Agers, Evangelicals and 
Muslims the opportunity to immerse themselves in social networks 
without losing their personal freedom, in short. As one of the pagan 
respondents of Macha Nightmare (2001: 65) notes: “If I want to learn 
about spirituality and have access to the Internet, I will be drawn to 
choose bits from a large number of sources, rather than taking all 
my information from one source. The resulting mix will be uniquely 
my own, rather than something dictated by an individual tradition.” 
Online networked types of sociality hence do not entail the strict social 
obligations of traditional communities. They are of a more voluntary 
nature and people can easily join in and leave as they wish. It is up 
to individual believers to decide on the degree and nature of their 
engagement; one may stick to a particular chat room and become a 
loyal visitor, or may visit it only occasionally while surfing the web. 
Although these ‘light’ organizational forms clearly differ markedly 
from firmly organized churches and mosques, it is equally clear that 
they contradict the notion that contemporary religion outside the 
boundaries of these established institutions entails nothing more than 
individuals who ‘do their own thing’ in splendid isolation of like-
minded others (Besecke, 2005). These social forms are simply better 
adapted to these contemporary strains of religion, that all feature a 
marked aversion to established religious traditions and institutions. 
Even though Evangelicalism is often organized in churches besides 
the aforementioned types of organization, these are no longer (what 
Weber has called) ‘hierocratic’ organizations, i.e., bodies characterized 
by a top-down, hierarchical structure and governed by authoritative 
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leaders with much power to control the community of believers. And 
even though the Salafi movement consists of several competing, and 
sometimes even plainly hostile, networks characterized by fission and 
fusion, each of these nonetheless features striking ideals of friendship, 
brotherhood and sisterhood (De Koning, 2009a). Contemporary quests 
for religious purity are, in short, no tragically isolated and privatized 
activities on a ‘market of ultimate significance’.
The networked sociality that constitutes the major social shape of 
religion among Dutch religious youth is easily overlooked by sociolo-
gists of religion, because it transcends the dichotomy between ‘thick’ 
and ‘greedy’ religious institutions on the one hand and self-contained 
and socially disembedded individuals on the other—a dichotomy that 
is not only central to Luckmann’s classical analysis, but also to much of 
classical and modern sociology in general (Maffesoli, 1996). We hence 
conclude with Besecke (2005) that beyond this increasingly inappli-
cable dichotomy, there are vibrant social conversations about religion 
and spirituality going on that need to be taken much more seriously 
than sociologists of religion have typically done in the past.
Pure Religion’s Social and Public Significance
The third claim that undergirds Luckmann’s privatization thesis is 
that modern religion remains firmly embedded in the private domain 
and hence lacks social and public significance (see also Bruce, 2002; 
Wilson, 1976). Again, this is not what we find among young Dutch 
New Agers, Evangelicals and Muslims. Although they no longer con-
sider the demands made by particularistic religious traditions and 
their institutions legitimate, so that these have lost their ability to 
guide them in deciding the type of lives they need to live, this does not 
mean that religion tout court has lost its ability to do so. Indeed, for 
the new religious purists, the ethical demands made by ‘pure’ religion 
or spirituality have replaced these made by fossilized traditions and 
institutions, motivating them even more than the latter to live their 
lives according to these. Entailing a revitalization and rejuvenation of 
religion, religious purification hence endows religion with new and 
increased moral fervor. 
This is even the case with New Age, allegedly the most privatized and 
least socially significant religion of the three cases under study (e.g., 
Bruce, 2002). The demand of being true to the inner self, of taking 
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one’s feelings, emotions, and intuitions seriously, means after all that 
basically everything—from sexuality to work—attains spiritual mean-
ing and significance, making this type of religion even more difficult to 
expel from the public domain than traditional churched Christianity. 
“Indeed there would seem to be no activity, no matter how prosaic, 
whether it be gardening, flower arranging, or even shopping, that is 
not now being presented [. . .] as if it were also a spiritual exercise, 
something capable of leading to self-discovery and personal growth”, 
Colin Campbell rightly notes (2007: 37). The social and public signifi-
cance of New Age spirituality that results from such an ‘essentially 
spiritual approach to life’ (Ibid.: 38) is particularly visible in the major 
role it has meanwhile come to play in the worlds of human resource 
management and business leadership (Aupers and Houtman, 2006; 
Costea et al., 2007).
The same goes for Evangelicalism: the experience of God’s con-
tinuous presence in one’s personal life spawns a strongly felt need 
to let Him guide one in all of one’s life—in socializing with others, 
in selecting a spouse, in making choices in one’s education or pro-
fessional career, etcetera (Roeland, 2009). Much of Evangelicalism’s 
increased visibility and vitality in the Dutch religious landscape takes 
the shape of a call for re-establishing religion as a moral resource for 
politics. Indeed, a recent analysis of Dutch survey data covering the 
period 1970–1996 demonstrates that while the number of Christians 
has declined steadily in this country, this process has coincided with 
a strengthening of the call for religious de-privatization and hence a 
larger role for religion in politics (Achterberg et al., 2009). Although it 
yet needs to be demonstrated that the latter trend is due to the Evan-
gelicalism found among young Protestants, the latter are clearly much 
less likely than other and older Christians to accept the ‘secularist 
truce’—the secularist contract that guarantees religious freedom, yet 
bans religion from the public sphere by relegating it to the private 
realm (see also Taylor, 2007).
The young generation of Moroccan-Dutch Muslims, finally, is also 
much more occupied with their religious identity than the older gen-
erations. Their quest for a purified Islam motivates them, too, to color 
more and more aspects of their private and public lives with their 
newly found pure Islam. It is a mere commonplace that Salafism in 
particular asserts the public relevance of ‘true’ Islam for law and poli-
tics in western societies. Although most Salafi networks were quietist 
until 2000, they meanwhile feature prominently in the media and in 
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political debates about Islam and radicalization. While the ongoing 
Dutch Islam debate has almost by definition turned Islam into a pub-
lic religion by making every single articulation of Islam a matter of 
public debate (Buijs, 2009; Buitelaar, 2008; De Koning, 2008a; Vliegen-
thart, 2007), the quest for ‘pure’ Islam in particular troubles opinion 
leaders who regard it as invariably radical, violent and intolerant (e.g., 
Hirsi Ali, 2007). As the principal targets of these critiques, Salafi orga-
nizations have been further stimulated to defend themselves against 
these charges by secular and anti-Islamic critics and to speak out for 
instance, about proposals to ban the face veil (niqab) or about Dutch 
foreign policies (De Koning, 2009b). 
If we understand secularization in classical Weberian terms, i.e., 
as a decline of the influence of religious worldviews on social action 
(Chaves, 1994), we must conclude that the purification of religion 
invokes processes of de-secularization—processes that contradict the 
claim that contemporary religion remains firmly embedded in the 
private domain and lacks social and public significance. The purified 
religious worldviews of young Dutch New Agers, Evangelicals and 
Muslims are after all highly salient to them and as such motivate them 
to make major efforts to live their private and public lives accordingly. 
Religious purification, in short, works against religious privatization 
by spawning processes of de-secularization and de-privatization. 
Conclusion: In Search of Religious Purity
After their path-breaking joint book The Social Construction of Reality 
(1966), Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann went different ways in the 
sociological study of religion with The Sacred Canopy (Berger, 1967) 
and The Invisible Religion (Luckmann, 1967). While they agreed about 
the erosion of the Christian monopoly and the concomitant emer-
gence of religious pluralism, they disagreed about the latter’s implica-
tions for the future of religion. Berger heralded the coming of a secular 
age and Luckmann expected merely religious change. According to 
Berger, who assumed that the existence of competing or even incom-
patible religious truth claims would undermine the plausibility of each 
of the competitors, religious pluralism would result in secularization. 
According to Luckmann, as explained above, religion does not—and 
indeed cannot—disappear, though it does disappear from the public 
domain and become privatized.
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While our research among young Dutch New Agers, Evangelicals 
and Muslims confirms that firmly institutionalized particularistic reli-
gious traditions have become less plausible and legitimate, it also sug-
gests that both Berger’s and Luckmann’s ideas about the consequences 
of this circumstance for the future of religion are flawed. Among reli-
gious Dutch youth, religious pluralism after all invokes neither radi-
cally privatized, ephemeral, uncommitted, and superficial religiosities 
(Luckmann), nor a full-out collapse of religious faith and a transition 
to secularism (Berger). Rather than a flight away from religious tradi-
tions and institutions towards either socially uncommitted ‘consumer 
religions’ (Luckmann) or a secularist outlook (Berger), we find zealous 
quests for ‘real’ and ‘pure’ religious truths that are solidly founded 
beyond the existing range of ‘implausible’ and ‘inauthentic’ religious 
traditions and institutions.
It is particularly striking to find that contemporary religious move-
ments as far apart as New Age and Islamic Salafism have this hunt for 
‘real’ or ‘pure’ religion in common. The two have after all often been 
portrayed as diametrically opposed extremes on a continuum rang-
ing from respectively socially uncommitted relativism and individual-
ism to blindly committed absolutism and collectivism (e.g., Bauman, 
1997). And although there is no doubt that they are in many ways 
radically different, they are nonetheless basically identical in their 
understanding of historically grown and manmade religious tradi-
tions and institutions. They both conceive of the latter as degenerated, 
diluted and distorted renditions of the ‘real’ religious truth, which has 
become buried under institutional side issues, and hence as flawed, 
corrupted and perverted excuses for the original, imposed upon the 
laity by corrupted regimes and priesthoods that are more interested 
in power than in religious piety and purity. 
Despite his classical analysis of the progressive disenchantment 
of the world, the resulting processes of religious purification in New 
Age, Evangelicalism and Islam alike are consistent with Max Weber’s 
(1963[1922]) sociology of religion, in particular his ideas about ‘cul-
tural rationalization’ (Campbell, 2007). Weber’s sociology of religion 
after all assumes a universal human need of giving meaning to an 
essentially meaningless world and is hence based on a conception 
of culture as ‘the endowment of a finite segment of the meaningless 
infinity of events in the world with meaning and significance from the 
standpoint of human beings’ (Schroeder, quoted by Campbell 2007: 
11). If religion loses its plausibility, it is hence not simply discarded, 
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but a process of religious reconstruction is sparked so as to regain 
lost religious plausibility (Campbell, 2007). Such a process of ‘ratio-
nalization’ is precisely what we find in progress among young New 
Agers, Evangelicals and Muslims in the Netherlands. Exactly because 
today’s religiously pluralist world embarrassingly exposes the particu-
larisms of a wide range of Islamic, Christian and other religious tradi-
tions and institutions, these lose their binding power, as Berger (1967) 
and Luckmann (1967) were both right to emphasize. This does how-
ever not produce a turn away from religious committedness, but rather 
a zealous hunt for ‘real’ religious truth in New Age, Evangelicalism 
and Islam alike, whatever the further differences between the three 
may be. 
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